

*Appeared**6 Feb 78**To Herbert Heth 357-7676
(with thanks)*

STROBE TALBOTT
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

686 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
OFFICE: (202) 298-4800
RESIDENCE: (202) 462-2002

TIME

INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BY

Strobe Talbott

TIME MAGAZINE REPORTERS

January 24, 1978

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

P R O C E E D I N G S

ADMIRAL TURNER: This is very light, compared to what else the media are saying that is incorrect. I regard him as a poor manager of people. I have been in the people managing profession for over 30 years, and Number One, I don't think you can have the record of success I have had in the military without being a good people manager, and I pride myself on being very people-conscious.

What people are saying in articles like this is, everybody isn't happy out at the CIA today, and that is correct, but they are working, they are working hard, and they are in better conditions today than they were six months ago, before I made some of these changes, and we are going to be effective out there, and over the long haul I predict we will be happy, too, but what do you people want? Do you want happy spies or do you want effective and well-controlled spies?

The media have gone overboard in listening to the grippers who have lost their jobs. It is unfortunate. I don't like to ask people to lose their jobs, but it had to be done in the name not only of short-term effectiveness, but in the name of the long-run good of the agency. In fact, we might not have an agency of any effectiveness in five or ten years if we don't do something drastic with the personnel situation, and it won't be long before it dawns upon the

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



1 35-year-olds in the organization that what I am doing is a
2 tremendous boon to them, the future of the CIA.

3 INTERVIEWER: In the sense that?

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: Today, in the four top super-
5 grades of the agency, between three of them, there is only a
6 one-year spread in the average age of all the people in each
7 grade. We have pushed some marvelous people who came into
8 this agency in the wake of World War Two and the Cold War
9 through the system, and they are all up at the top, and they
10 are all there, 50 years of age, and when they go, Strobe, in
11 a few years, as they will -- the average retirement age is
12 52 -- there is going to be a great void, so I am cleaning
13 some of that out and making room for the 35-year-olds to
14 begin moving, so that when we have to fill all those places
15 up there, we have people who have got some experience.
16 Otherwise, I am just going to have to jump them, because
17 there is a big difference.

18 If Time Magazine has all its vice presidents retire
19 in a three-year period, you go to Newsweek and U. S. News and
20 World Report and a lot of other places, and you get good
21 vice presidents. I can't do that in the section of the CIA
22 that has had these reductions in force. I cannot go out on
23 the street and get a trained spy. I have got to grow them
24 from within.

25 So, this painful process, which really was a small



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 percentage cut of those who were forced to leave, is not
2 because I am mean and not a good people manager. It is
3 because I am really looking after the long-term people
4 interests, or I am not going to have trained, capable leaders
5 for the 1980's and 1990's, because all these old fellows are
6 going to retire, all at one time, because they are all
7 bunched up there. End of speech.

8 I resent the superficiality with which people are
9 passing judgment on what is good personnel management.
10 Because people gripe doesn't mean they are not being well-
11 managed. The object in life is not to make people happy.
12 If you can do that and be effective and have their respect,
13 that's great, and I will get there, and I'll guarantee you I
14 will get there. You are writing your story a year too early,
15 but I am going to get effective, and I am going to get their
16 respect, and then I'll get their happiness.

17 INTERVIEWER: Well, you understand that what we
18 are doing here is reporting, not passing judgment so much
19 ourselves.

20 ADMIRAL TURNER: It is shallow reporting, because
21 there are no facts behind it. What are the facts behind that
22 statement that I am a poor people manager?

23 INTERVIEWER: There is widespread controversy and
24 criticism, and I hasten to add something that I pointed out
25 in one take in the story that I have already sent out, which

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2305

1 is that every single one of your predecessors, especially
2 during the time of troubles that has prevailed at the CIA
3 for the last five or six years, has had more than he con-
4 sidered his share of controversy to deal with. This happens
5 to have been your lot.

6 There are three charges made against you, and this
7 is one of them. The other is that you were, you know, empire
8 building, and trying to make yourself an intelligence czar
9 last year. I think I know the counterargument to that. I
10 would be very interested in yours. The third is that your
11 sweep or whatever you want to call it of the DDO was
12 unnecessarily brutal or insensitive, or something like that.

13 Those are the three charges, and lots of people say
14 it, including people fairly high -- not the highest, but
15 at high levels in the National Security Council and State
16 Department, and other than just at the agency. So, it is
17 something we have to report. That is our feeling on it.

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: You ought to put it in context.
19 You are getting mainly the gripes of those who were asked to
20 leave. How do you dismiss 212 people in a nice, pleasant
21 way? You can go out on the street and talk to lots of those
22 212, and they have all got a different way, but when you get
23 down to the bottom line, because I have talked to a lot of
24 them, the bottom line is, I wouldn't go. You'd go, and you'd
25 go, but I wouldn't go. That is the bottom line of how they

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 would make it more pleasant, and in addition, the ones who
2 get out on the street in an unprofessional way talking with
3 the media about their complaints have said it was cold. Each
4 one was addressed by his superior. He wasn't given a two-
5 sentence letter. He was given a personal interview, of
6 which the letter was then simply an affirmation that he had
7 to go look in the rest of the agency for replacement, and he
8 will get a nice letter when the time comes if we don't place
9 him elsewhere, but he was given a personal notice that he was
10 going. Nobody tells about that, because they are all unhappy.

11 It wasn't done as brutally as everybody says, and
12 it is just ironic that the media are so enthusiastic about
13 all these good old experienced spies who brought you all the
14 things that you railed against for all those years, and now
15 the fact that they are being asked to retire under a special
16 retirement program that the Congress set up just to ensure
17 that in an organization like this, where you must grow the
18 new executives from within -- you can't go outside -- that
19 you have a pruning process at the top to make room for that --
20 It is very similar to the military, who can't go outside and
21 get admirals and generals from the business world, and they
22 have a pruning system. It is different. It is more
23 established. It is more understood.

24 The problem I have is that this is a new, young
25 organization. It is 30 years old. It has never worried yet

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 550-2345

1 about its personnel situation for the long haul. You can
2 run for 30 years holding your breath, and that is what we've
3 done, with excellent people, but they only last so long, and
4 there is a void now at the top. That is, there is a per-
5 ceivable void coming at the top, and I am taking the action
6 to set up a personnel management system, of which this is
7 just the first step, the most painful part of the step, that
8 will let us run for the long run, on an endurance run, until
9 we have intelligence for this country when your children are
10 interviewing my successor's successor's successor.

11 INTERVIEWER: Maybe if I could break in a little
12 bit, Strobe explained this article extremely well yesterday --
13 I just haven't had a chance to talk to you -- and said that
14 this part of the article, DEO cuts and past abuses, they
15 hope will be a very minor part. Maybe you can tell the
16 Admiral a little bit about that, as you did with Jack
17 yesterday, the kind of thing you have in mind.

18 INTERVIEWER 1: Yes, I would like to. Right. Let
19 me sketch what we are trying to do. Let me also say that
20 I can't say mea culpa on behalf of the magazine for including
21 a sentence like that. It is a privilege to be able to sit
22 down with a high Administration official so shortly after he
23 has had a chance to read an article about him in Time
24 Magazine. I don't know whether I should be glad or unhappy
25 that only one sentence has a red line on it. Maybe there are

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

lots of others that would have orange lines or something.

ADMIRAL TURNER: That is the only one that bothered me. I don't mind being criticized, and I don't do everything right.

INTERVIEWER 1: Well, criticism is part of the story, and it is up to us to put it into context, and part of putting this into context we will now be able to do better as a result of some stuff that Herb and Dennis gave me yesterday on the background of the DDO thing, the fact that you inherited this situation --

ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't even propose the cut.

INTERVIEWER 1: -- from your predecessor, and so on, and the fact that of the 820, only 45, is it, are actually in any sense fired, the first 212, and that many others are going to be relocated or retired, and so forth and so on, and if we spend any time on that at all, we will put that into context, but the subject of our cover story is not Stansfield Turner and whether he is overweening, or what kind of a people manager he is. It is what kind of --

ADMIRAL TURNER: I didn't complain about overweening because I didn't understand it. You will have to give me a dictionary. Okay, go ahead. I'm sorry.

INTERVIEWER 1: I am not sure it is entirely uncomplimentary. I think you probably have to be -- to the extent that I understand the word, you probably have to be

1 overweening in a job like that or in the job you left.

2 We want to look at your --

3 ADMIRAL TURNER: You are going to get me off of
4 that, are you?

5 INTERVIEWER 1: Yes. We want to ask some big
6 questions, such as, what kind of intelligence community
7 should a democracy have, specifically the United States, in
8 the late seventies and 1980's? What kind is it likely to
9 have as a result of the constraints and the convulsions, the
10 constraints that have been imposed and the convulsions that
11 it has undergone, during the last four or five years? That
12 really is the subject of our story. To the extent that there
13 is a face to attach to that story, it is yours, because
14 assuming you aren't on your way out the back door within the
15 next couple of months -- and I believe on the basis not only
16 of what you have said, but what I have heard elsewhere in
17 town, that that is not the case, that you are going to be
18 around for a while -- you are the guy who is going to have
19 to preside over at least an initial answer to those questions,
20 and that is what I want to talk about.

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: Okay. I can describe it for you
22 in four sentences.

23 INTERVIEWER 1: Okay, shoot.

24 ADMIRAL TURNER: It has got to be a well-coordinated
25 operation across the many agencies involved in it. It has

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



1 got to be an organization that encourages differing and
2 dissenting interpretations. It has got to be an organization
3 that is as open as possible with the American people, and it
4 has got to be an organization that operates under a system
5 of checks and balances, oversights and controls such that
6 the American people have assurance we are doing what we are
7 supposed to do and not doing what we are not supposed to do,
8 but with latitude within that ethical, legal constraint to
9 do the job effectively.

10 I believe that with the Executive Order that was
11 signed today by the President, with the spadework that has
12 been going on for the last 12 months under this Administra-
13 tion, we can achieve all of those objectives, but it won't be
14 easy. It is going to take another couple of years of shake-
15 down, first to turn the Community into a true community --
16 my first point on coordination. Intelligence that we are
17 judging in your terms that you mentioned, Strobe, is not --
18 we are not building a system that is fit for a democracy. We
19 are building a system that is fit for the largest democracy
20 in the world, and the difference in intelligence today from
21 many years past is, there is no way any other country besides
22 perhaps the Soviet Union can have the type of intelligence
23 that we do, because it is so costly, so technical. Small
24 countries can no longer compete across the full spectrum of
25 intelligence operations that we do, so we bear a particular

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



responsibility today to the whole free world.

I am not denigrating other intelligence organizations. Some of them are superb. -- I am talking about free ones, now -- in their own areas, but none have the breadth that we do, but that causes us special problems that people frequently don't understand in other countries, because you have to bring all this together. It is a large organization, and already I see very encouraging signs, and partly as a result of the new authorities that have in fact been mine since August, when the Presidential decision was made of which the order today was the embodiment, that the Community, whether they be housed in Defense, or the State Department, or the Department of Energy, or wherever it may be, want to pull together, and are doing so better.

I am very, very encouraged with this aspect of it. I have put together the first budget that a DCI, Director of Central Intelligence, put together without being committed. I was it. It is a good budget. It is a tight budget. It was hotly debated within the Intelligence Community, but it ended up in an amicable situation in which people's interests were well represented, and I don't think anybody went away disgruntled that he hadn't had a fair day in court.

We have a long way to go yet, to tie all these ends together, to be sure that what everybody is doing is coordinated so that you don't drop between the cracks, so

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 you don't waste the taxpayers' money by duplicating, so that
2 when one person collects some information, that another one
3 needs, that it gets there.

4 The second point. I think we are making progress
5 in the analytic side. I am very proud of some of the
6 national estimates we have done. It is a shame I can't
7 discuss them in detail in unclassified form, but I can assure
8 you that we have undertaken in the last six months some of
9 the difficult analyses, like the one that led to the Team A-
10 Team B fiasco last year at this time, and we have brought
11 together the Community's talents on these in a way that has
12 led to a harmonious resolution of the differences without
13 turning out pablum, without turning out intelligence by
14 compromise.

15 Where there are dissenting views, they are clearly
16 stated, but we haven't had people at each other's throats.
17 We have sat down, and I have forced people to say that we --
18 very few footnotes, which is the usual way of expressing
19 dissent. I am opposed to that. I want the dissent to be in
20 the text. I want the primary view to be stated -- we
21 believe there are 22 missiles in this situation -- and then
22 I want the dissenting view -- we believe that there are 15
23 missiles in this situation. The reason for these differences
24 is the following, A, B, C. Do you see what I mean? In that
25 way the dissenter's view is read by the reader, not just

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 tucked in the corner, but that way the dissenter must also
2 express his reasons in the same terms as the assenter, if
3 you see what I mean, and the reader may compare them easily.

4 We are making real progress on this, and some of
5 the estimates that we have done in recent months, I believe,
6 are exceptionally --

7 INTERVIEWER: Well, you can't, of course, discuss
8 them in detail, but can you discuss them in any sort of
9 general way, but less general than you just have? What sort
10 of issues?

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, take the strategic balance,
12 the issue that was Team A-Team B of last year. We have
13 redone that. I will be briefing it to Congress starting
14 tomorrow. The dissenting views are there, but they are
15 clearly laid out so that people can grasp them. There isn't
16 this acrimony that existed last year, where people just took
17 extreme positions in order to be sure the compromise came
18 out as close to their position as they could.

19 People have taken what they think is their position.
20 We have been able to resolve some of them, because they were
21 really more of emotion than they were of substance when they
22 were forced to write them down concretely. Those we couldn't
23 resolve, we have left and clearly elucidated.

24 On top of that, we have found better ways to
25 illustrate the comparisons of these forces.

1 On my third angle, I am just so proud of what we
2 have contributed in the last nine months to the public debate
3 on major issues by a policy of greater openness. Look at
4 this morning's newspaper. One of them had a big, long story
5 about Soviet oil extraction problems. We triggered that off
6 last April by releasing a study on the Soviet oil problem.
7 Now it has been germinating. People have been attacking it.
8 People have been supporting it. Here is one that comes out
9 this morning that comes to all the same conclusions and says
10 we're wrong. That's fine.

11 We put out a study on the Soviet economy and its
12 prospects, several of them, as a matter of fact, a study on
13 international terrorism, a study on the world energy situa-
14 tion, and all these have given the taxpayer a return on his
15 money for investment in intelligence. We have not compro-
16 mised our central information base or the way we get our
17 information, and in my opinion we have enhanced the quality
18 of national debate on these key issues.

19 I intend to keep on with this program. I will be
20 criticized sometimes for supporting the Administration's
21 policy, and I will be criticized sometimes for not supporting
22 it. I am not doing either. I am giving the information that
23 we have.

24 Finally, I am very encouraged by the progress we
25 have made in the oversight areas. Our relationship with the



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 two Committees of Congress is very good, but "good" should not
2 be interpreted to mean anything but an oversight, and over-
3 view process. We report to them. They interrogate us.
4 They quiz us. But also, that process is very helpful to us.
5 We get a feel for what they, representing the people of this
6 country, want us to do, and what bounds we can operate in.

7 We get advice. We get support when we need it
8 with other parts of the Congress. We have a body we can turn
9 to now so that we don't get bandied back and forth between
10 two or three Committees who want to pull us in different
11 directions. We have somebody we can go to and say, I've got
12 a problem with another portion of the Congress, will you
13 help me? But they are also conducting very thorough over-
14 sight, and I am confident from the way this has evolved over
15 this past year that when we write the new charters, which
16 will be the legislative enforcement of many of the things
17 that were signed today by the President in an Executive
18 Order, that we will find the right balance between too much
19 control and too little, because there are clear risks in the
20 process of oversight.

21 The first risk is that we will end up with
22 intelligence by temerity. We won't take any risks, because
23 somebody might criticize us. The second is exposure. If
24 you have too many people viewing a sensitive operation, it
25 may get blown into the public, and cost somebody's life or

1 abort the operation or whatever, but I have found under-
2 standing in the Congress with regard to how we set up the
3 rules for the disclosure, and I think they are finding that
4 we are able to give them what they need for oversight while
5 retaining enough control to protect people and interests that
6 are vital.

7 INTERVIEWER: Could we talk about that for a
8 minute? I think if there is a concern, a widespread concern
9 about the future of American intelligence, it is probably
10 focused on the whole area of covert action, and not on
11 whether the world's richest democracy -- whether it is the
12 largest or not I don't know -- is capable of gathering
13 information and analyzing it. It is a question of whether
14 the United States has left itself with what Bill Colby used
15 to call some option in between a diplomatic protest and
16 sending in the Marines.

17 There is a widespread perception -- perhaps it is
18 a misperception -- that the answer is, no, it hasn't left
19 itself with that option, and that the Community over which
20 you preside is crippled in that respect.

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: I neither think it is crippled nor
22 that there is going to be undue emphasis on it. You are
23 treading a fine line in between. In the past, the country
24 not only wanted us to collect intelligence, they wanted us
25 to influence the events that we were getting intelligence

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 about: Iran, -- Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, and all those that
2 tried to use the Central Intelligence Agency to take
3 political action to effect the outcome of events. I don't
4 think the country wants that much interference in other
5 people's affairs by covert means today as it has in the past.
6 I don't think it is as effective today as it was in the past,
7 and frequently it was not effective in the past, as you well
8 know. The batting average is not big league. But I am
9 dedicated to preserving for this country the capability to
10 turn to political action when, Number One, it suits the
11 purpose, and Two, it is properly authorized.

12 That doesn't mean by the intelligence people.
13 This is not intelligence business. This is an adjunct to
14 our business. It fits with it. We are the best qualified
15 to do it, but it is not our profession. We are happy to do
16 it when the country wants us to.

17 INTERVIEWER: The country in the person of the
18 President?

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: And the Congress. Congress passed
20 a law called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires that we
21 notify them when we are undertaking covert action, so there
22 is a double check on anyone doing covert action in this
23 country. One is the whole National Security Council process,
24 culminated in the person of the President, and the other then
25 are the Committees of the Congress, who are to be notified of

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 this and can presumably find ways to register objections
2 they feel as appropriate.

3 So, I think there are adequate controls. I will
4 certainly admit to you that I have some concern about undue
5 amount of notification. I would like to see us notify fewer
6 Committees of the Congress, because you can't start an action
7 like this and in the middle of it have it go public.

8 INTERVIEWER: Is it still eight?

9 ADMIRAL TURNER: It is still theoretically eight
10 that the Committees are understanding, and we hope that as
11 these Intelligence Committees get well established, and they
12 have representation from the other six Committees, if you
13 see what I mean -- the members overlap.

14 INTERVIEWER: There are two, one for each House?

15 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. That we will be able to
16 do less formal notification up there, and let the two
17 Committees spread the word to those others who need it.

18 INTERVIEWER: Admiral, you will have a lot easier time
19 dissolving my skepticism or whatever criticisms entailed in
20 that article, the item that we talked about at the
21 beginning, than you will dissolving my skepticism on the
22 point we are talking about now. I just do not understand how
23 it is possible to conduct in assured secrecy covert operation
24 abroad with the degree of disclosure that you are legally
25 obligated to now. Is there any way you could --

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: We are doing it. We are doing it
2 on a small scale today. We have not by any means abandoned
3 covert action. While it has been much scaled down from the
4 height of the fifties and sixties, it does continue. I
5 arrived here in March, and we haven't had any leak of any
6 covert action operation since that time, and I think that
7 the Congress is acting in a very responsible way here.

8 INTERVIEWER: Are we doing as much as you feel we
9 ought to have been doing, given the needs on the ground
10 abroad?

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. Unequivocally, yes. I have
12 on a number of occasions gone to our covert action people and
13 said, I see the country has a problem in such and such an
14 area today, would you develop me a covert action plan, because
15 I want to have it in my pocket when I go to a National
16 Security Council meeting?

17 I am not the guy who should push covert action. I
18 am not a policy-maker, but if someone who is a policy-maker
19 at a meeting like that says, Turner, what can you do for us
20 in the way of covert action here, I like to reach in my
21 pocket and have it there, ready, and in all the times, which
22 are quite a few, that I have asked for that support, I have
23 not found it such an attractive alternative that I thought
24 people were missing the boat.

25 A couple of times it has been accepted. I mean,

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 the idea has percolated, and we have gone ahead, but on the
2 whole I have not found it a very attractive option. When I
3 was asked for it, I would present it, but would not be able
4 to argue strongly for it because it didn't look like it was
5 that good.

6 INTERVIEWER: So we have been able to keep doing
7 it where you felt it was necessary? There has been no leak
8 of significance damagingly --

9 ADMIRAL TURNER: That is correct.

10 INTERVIEWER: -- about an ongoing operation while
11 you have been in this job?

12 An extension of that question is, do you think that
13 you have the wherewithal and the necessary discretion from
14 Congress to do what might be necessary given all sorts of
15 hypothetical developments that I am sure your people have
16 presented you with in the form of contingency papers and so
17 on?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: Only if there was in fact general
19 Congressional -- which almost means public -- support for the
20 nation's approach to the problem. I don't mean that the
21 public would know about the covert action, but I am saying
22 that if the Executive Branch wanted to go charging off on a
23 covert action to accomplish Objective X, and the country as
24 a whole did not approve of Objective X as represented to the
25 Congress, then I think we would have a problem, but I think

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 that is what the people want today in terms of some form of
2 restraint on covert action.

3 INTERVIEWER: Oh, I agree. I am glad we are able
4 to keep the dialogue going, because I realize it is both the
5 most interesting and the most difficult aspect of the
6 subject that we are going to try to address.

7 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. I hope you don't devote the
8 whole piece to covert action, because as I say, that is such
9 a small portion of --

10 INTERVIEWER: Well, we are not. It is a small
11 portion. How big a portion? Is there any way you can give
12 me some idea of the percentage or amount of resources,
13 human and financial, that are being spent in that area?

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: About all I can say is that it is
15 very small, and it takes a limited number of people. It
16 takes sort of a stand-by capability. I mean, what we are
17 doing today is operating in covert action rather modestly,
18 but retaining, not a large, but a cadre of skill to do
19 different things if we are needed, if you see what I mean.

20 INTERVIEWER: Well, you see, that is the question.
21 Are we operating modestly because of the climate and because
22 of the dead end of the past, of the last five years that is
23 on your shoulder, or are we operating modestly because we
24 ought to be operating modestly?

25 ADMIRAL TURNER: I can't see in many cases where

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 there is a real good case for it, and part of it is the
2 greater visibility today of anything you do, and I am not
3 talking just about leaks. I am talking about the persistence,
4 quite proper, of the media in general, but let's say Country
5 X is having an election tomorrow, and we like Party A and
6 don't like Party B. Don't you feel that if we go into that
7 country and started to feed money to people in Party A --
8 assuming we are totally free of leaks in the United States --

9 INTERVIEWER: Big assumption.

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: Big assumption. That there is
11 also a high probability that there will be a leak in
12 Country A, or Country X, or whatever I called it, and if
13 there is a leak in Country X that we have fed money to Party
14 A, they may prefer not to have ever had that money. It may
15 redound against them.

16 I don't think people worried about that 15 years
17 ago. Right?

18 INTERVIEWER: Maybe they should have.

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: There wasn't -- well, I don't
20 think it was exposed 15 years ago. Today we are getting
21 some exposures of what was done 15 years ago.

22 INTERVIEWER: And some of the personalities are
23 the same.

24 ADMIRAL TURNER: But in a sense, you could say, we
25 got away with it in the past, but today you probably

1 wouldn't get the politicians in Party A in Country X to
2 accept the money, for fear that if it became public they
3 would lose more than they would gain. So, I am saying, some
4 of the tools that have been used in the past have different
5 effectiveness in a different world climate.

6 INTERVIEWER: Are you saying that since you came
7 into this job, we have not, the United States has not
8 covertly funded friendly political forces in foreign
9 countries?

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: I just don't comment on our
11 operations one way or the other, because that gets me into
12 a corner. If I say yes or no to that one, why, you would
13 draw conclusions which may or may not be right, but I really
14 plead with you that I should have perhaps added a fifth
15 characterization to what I see as the reshaping of American
16 intelligence today, and that is moving away from the two
17 foci of intelligence for its first 20 or 25 years in this
18 country.

19 The first was on covert action, which we have now
20 discussed pretty thoroughly, why I think we need to shift
21 away from it to some extent. The second was preoccupation
22 with the Soviet Union, and particularly military aspects of
23 the Soviet Union, and when you got past the Soviet Union,
24 there were half a dozen countries in Eastern Europe that were
25 their satellites that we were interested in, and when you got

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 past that you got into the areas of the world where the
2 Soviets were making forays, which then led to political
3 action.

4 I am saying that today we have got to look at most
5 of the 150-odd countries of the world in some way or
6 another, because many, many, many of them we have legitimate
7 needs for good intelligence information on, and of course in
8 most of those countries that far transcends military matters.
9 It gets into economic as well as political. So, the
10 character of the whole organization has got to shift to
11 accommodate that.

12 Let me not leave any doubt. Soviet military is
13 the Number One intelligence issue, and must remain that, but
14 I am saying without neglecting that cardinal line of defense
15 we have got to be able to tackle how much wider a range of
16 subjects today, and that in turn means immense problems in
17 personnel programs, training people, recruiting people, and
18 new techniques of analysis, new techniques of collecting
19 information, because you weren't interested in wheat ten
20 years ago.

21 I am chastised today because we missed the Soviet
22 grain harvest by 10 percent. Five years ago we didn't even
23 try. The Department of Agriculture misses by 5 percent of
24 the United States frequently. I would like to do better.
25 I apologize for not hitting it on the nose. I am going to

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 try to do better, but we are going through these throes of
2 adjustment.

3 That brings you back to where I came in at the
4 beginning. People are unsettled because the milieu is
5 changing, the tasking is changing, the whole environment is
6 changing, including the openness, including the oversight,
7 which hasn't been here before.

8 INTERVIEWER: I appreciate your admonition that I
9 not and that the magazine not dwell too much, disproportionately
10 on the covert action thing. One of the reasons I am taking
11 the opportunity to ask you about this is because, of all the
12 people that I and my colleagues who are working on the story
13 are talking to, both on the record, through Herb's good
14 offices, and people we can encounter on our own, you are the
15 only one, certainly on the record you are the only one who
16 can talk at all authoritatively about that.

17 So, the fact that I do put some stress on that
18 question doesn't mean that that becomes the exclusive
19 preoccupation of the story. Don't get me wrong on that.

20 That said, I do have another couple of questions
21 on that, because, you know, we have been reading so much
22 about that in terms of past horror stories, but the question
23 remains, has the pendulum swung too far the other way, so
24 that we are deprived of being able to do things that we really
25 ought to be able to do in certain extremis situations that

1 come up?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, what would you like to do?
3 Give me an example. I mean, not in a particular country,
4 but the kind of thing you would like to do.

5 INTERVIEWER: All right, a country called Lower
6 Slabovia, which is a very large, mostly desert, Middle
7 Eastern kingdom which is terribly rich in oil, and we are
8 extremely dependent on that oil, and all of a sudden the
9 pro-American, fairly conservative monarchy is overthrown by
10 a Qaddafi-like leftist pro-Soviet group. Do we have the
11 wherewithal to do something about that situation short of
12 sending in the Marines?

13 ADMIRAL TURNER: Did we ever?

14 INTERVIEWER: Yes, we did. We did with Mosedeg.
15 in Iran. So, yes, we did.

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: All right.

17 INTERVIEWER: Do we now?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: I am not sure, but I am not
19 persuaded that my uncertainty is a result of our lack of
20 capabilities in our closet.

21 INTERVIEWER: Yes. What is it?

22 ADMIRAL TURNER: I think what you could do with
23 Mosedeg in 1953 and what you can do in a country overseas
24 today, 25 years later, is quite different. The environment
25 is so different. As I said in the previous illustration,

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 evidence of external tampering, particularly from one of the
2 major powers, has tremendous internal ramifications in a
3 country like that today that it didn't back then, and it has
4 tremendous external ramifications today that it didn't back
5 then, particularly when we had a different relationship
6 with the Soviet Union in many ways than we do today, but I
7 think the skills, the capabilities that were available to us
8 in those several quite successful covert actions in 1953 in
9 Iran and in 1954 in Guatemala are still available to us today,
10 if they are applicable to the situation, if they would in
11 fact have a high probability of being successful.

12 INTERVIEWER: Is your confidence in the Congress
13 and the current oversight arrangement such that that would
14 not preclude you from using those tools if, all other things
15 being equal, you felt that it was necessary to use them?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

17 INTERVIEWER: Okay, the last question on this
18 trickiest of subjects. Are there any circumstances in which
19 assassination is justified?

20 ADMIRAL TURNER: No. No, I shouldn't answer that
21 question in that way. I tried to answer it before you used
22 your last word. I am not passing judgment on whether it is
23 justified or not. All I am telling you is that categorically
24 I am prohibited from doing it, so I haven't in my mind been
25 particularly worried about the moral question of whether it

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 is justified or not. I am -- I guess it isn't quite legally.
2 It is in that Executive Order that was signed today, and it
3 was in the previous Executive Order.

4 INTERVIEWER: It was in President Ford's as well,
5 wasn't it?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes. So, I am inhibited by
7 Executive Order. As I say, it is not legal. It is just a
8 fine point. It is not a law, but it is a direct order to me
9 by the President of the United States, and I am going to
10 carry that out.

11 INTERVIEWER: When President Ford -- I was covering
12 the White House then, and I remember it very well. I think
13 it was February of 1976, something like that.

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: February of 1976.

15 INTERVIEWER: President Ford got up and talked
16 about that Executive Order, and he said that assassination
17 was ruled out, assassination of foreign leaders was ruled
18 out, and I asked a follow-up question about whether he meant
19 to limit that to foreign leaders. Is it ruled out for any
20 human being, whether he is privileged to be a leader or not?

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, sir. You, anybody.

22 INTERVIEWER: Even journalists?

23 ADMIRAL TURNER: Even journalists. It is
24 unequivocal. Just, period, assassinations. It doesn't talk
25 about who at all.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 INTERVIEWER: Is that a constraint that you feel
2 prohibits in any way or limits the Intelligence Community
3 from doing what it might have to do in imaginable circum-
4 stances?

5 ADMIRAL TURNER: The only way I have thought of
6 that possibly inhibiting us is an overly legalistic
7 interpretation of it.

8 INTERVIEWER: Of the word "assassination?"

9 ADMIRAL TURNER: Of the word "assassination." For
10 instance, in a hijacking situation. Somebody could possibly
11 overinterpret this that you were going into the plane with
12 the intent to kill the hijackers as opposed --

13 INTERVIEWER: Or if you did kill the hijacker,
14 for that matter.

15 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think it depends on the
16 definition of the word, but if you go in and you get into a
17 gun battle with them, why, that is one thing. You are
18 entitled to defend yourself, and so on, but you would have
19 to get a lawyer on this.

20 INTERVIEWER: We've got some good ones.

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't really think it is going
22 to be a problem, and of course being an Executive Order, we
23 do have the opportunity today, if we were in some extremis
24 situation where it was justified to take human life for a
25 good cause, like a hijacking situation, why, at least we can

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 get the President to make an exception, you see. Now, if it
2 gets into law, we are going to have to be very precise on
3 how that law is worded so we don't get into an absolutely
4 absurd situation. Nobody wants to do assassinations of the
5 type that we are really talking about.

6 INTERVIEWER: Does it rule out paramilitary actions
7 where people get killed? Where guns are fired?

8 ADMIRAL TURNER: No, that I don't think can be
9 interpreted as assassination.

10 INTERVIEWER: Is assassination the word used in
11 the Executive Order?

12 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

13 INTERVIEWER: Okay.

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: We are retaining a paramilitary
15 capability on stand-by as part of our covert action kit.

16 INTERVIEWER: All right. Moving right along, it
17 is my impression from some conversations I have had in the
18 last couple of weeks and indeed from the last time we did a
19 fairly major story on the agency that the folks in DDO are
20 getting more involved in the general areas of anti-terrorism
21 and combatting international drug traffic, two targets of
22 covert action that I think would be almost universally
23 applauded, except perhaps by the people involved in those
24 activities.

25 Is there anything at all you can tell me about

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 the interest you have taken in that?

2 Have you upgraded an office within the DDO that
3 has dealt with terrorism? Have you put some especially good
4 people in charge of that? Have you diverted more funds into
5 those kinds of less controversial covert action?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, we have put more emphasis in
7 this past year on both anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics. We
8 have done it by allocating some increase of resources. We
9 have done it by re-emphasizing to our chiefs of station in
10 the areas where those conditions are important that that
11 objective is high on their list when it is competing for their
12 own resources. We have had some important successes in both
13 areas, which again I wish I could describe to you in more
14 detail, but we feel that in a number of instances it has been
15 our intelligence, not our covert action -- these two fields
16 are really pure intelligence, from our point of view. I
17 guess they could get into covert action, but they have not.

18 We have been able to abort intended terrorist
19 operations from time to time by alerting people to them.
20 Through our intelligence we have been able to assist the
21 law enforcement agencies in getting information that led to
22 their actions. We cooperate with foreign governments in
23 both of these areas. In fact, it is one of the more
24 encouraging things. If there has to be a terrorist black
25 cloud on the horizon, the silver lining is that it is

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 bringing cooperation between many nations in which the
2 intelligence field is only one part, of course.

3 INTERVIEWER: That is interesting.

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: So, we are very willing to
5 exchange information with our fellow free world intelligence
6 agencies during a period of crisis, like the Lufthansa
7 plane that ended up in Mogodisho, Somalia. I mean, everybody
8 who could contribute to that was feeding it in to the Germans.
9 It was their problem and their action.

10 INTERVIEWER: Including you folks?

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: We were feeding everything we
12 could to them, and I am sure so were the French, and the
13 British, and their other friends. I mean, after all, it is
14 just your humanitarian instincts. If you have any
15 intelligence that would be helpful in this, why, you've got
16 to contribute it. It has lessened some of the barriers to
17 a flow of intelligence in this one area, and I think that may
18 be helpful to us in other areas over time in working with our
19 close allies.

20 So, there is some silver lining.

21 INTERVIEWER: What are some of the other areas of
22 opportunity? You say it could help in some other areas.

23 ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I am just saying when you get
24 to exchanging information, you are dropping the barriers in
25 exchanging intelligence.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 INTERVIEWER: I mean, are you thinking of sort
2 of economic crises that might occur where the CIA would have
3 very good information on availability of food in different
4 parts of the world, that kind of thing? Maybe you didn't
5 have a specific in mind.

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: I really didn't have a specific
7 in mind, and it would vary with every country. Different
8 countries have particular skills or access to information
9 which we don't have, and we have some that they don't have,
10 and as appropriate, we try to promote exchanges with our
11 close friends and allies.

12 INTERVIEWER: Does most of what you said about
13 anti-terrorist covert action apply to anti-international
14 drug trafficking, too?

15 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think so. In drug
16 trafficking, we have maybe even more of a problem than we do
17 in anti-terrorism, maybe not. Maybe it is a fine line, but
18 we have to be very, very careful there with the regulations
19 that have been established that we don't trespass on the
20 rights of Americans, and we can get into a position where --
21 we only operate overseas in these matters, but obviously
22 sometimes the Americans involved in drug traffic are
23 themselves overseas, so we have to work in close concert
24 with the Drug Enforcement Agency to be sure that they do the
25 law enforcement aspects of things, and that we stay out of

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 any activity that involves Americans.

2 That is somewhat inhibiting at times, but it is
3 one of these compromises you have to draw between preserving
4 rights of our people under the Constitution and being as
5 effective as you would like to be in some of these areas.

6 INTERVIEWER: As far as you are concerned, has the
7 persistent proposal, persistently rejected, to split covert
8 action away from the CIA altogether and give it to another
9 agency in the government been buried once and for all, or is
10 that something that you in your tenure and your successors
11 are going to have to cope with?

12 ADMIRAL TURNER: Strobe, I have been around the
13 government a long time, and I have seen very few things that
14 ever get buried permanently, seriously.

15 INTERVIEWER: Could you make the argument on the
16 record one more time, just because one of my editors in
17 particular is interested in that?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: I came into this organization
19 with a prejudice, thinking that it should be separated, at
20 least it should be separated within the CIA out from under
21 the DDO and over under me or something quite separate. My
22 experience in this past year has persuaded me that that would
23 be costly to the government and perhaps dangerous, costly in
24 that you would end up constructing an organization, including
25 overseas people, just for covert action, whereas today we get

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 dual service out of people, and particularly when our covert
2 action is at a low level. The reservoir is the clandestine
3 collection of intelligence people, if you see what I mean,
4 and you shift them as you have to if you have a covert action
5 operation, whereas you would create a whole new organization
6 and bureaucracy, and that in itself would begin to generate
7 a demand to do something.

8 You see, we can keep the people busy doing a very
9 essential intelligence collection function if there is no
10 demand for covert action, so I think it would create a
11 bureaucracy that would try to, not maliciously, because the
12 people in it would be good and energetic, would be promoting
13 covert action. I don't look on that as our function, as I
14 told you before. I look on it as being ready to do what we
15 are asked to do, but not being out drumming up business.

16 INTERVIEWER: One other "why not" question. Why
17 did we have to work so hard this week to get figures on the
18 budget to include in our story?

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: Figures on the intelligence
20 budget?

21 INTERVIEWER: Yes, and the way it is divided up.
22 Why is it that we have to go back to Marks and Marchetti and
23 factor in inflation and take a wild estimate? Why can't we
24 simply know from an authoritative source, like Herb Hetchy's
25 office, or something like that? Why must the budget,

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 and especially as it is broken down, remain secret?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: Simply because you are under-
3 estimating the ability of other people to focus on where they
4 should take countermeasures to our intelligence collection
5 efforts, if they know where we are concentrating our efforts.
6 I mean, where would you stop? Would you want to know exactly
7 how many dollars we are putting into a particular airplane
8 based in a particular country with a particular camera?

9 INTERVIEWER: No --

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: The countries all within range
11 of that airplane from that base would obviously --

12 INTERVIEWER: -- that would be unreasonable even
13 from a journalist.

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: All right, then how do you draw
15 a line? You see, that is the problem, drawing a line between
16 there and either one figure for the total budget or no
17 figure is almost impossible, and if we drew the line not at
18 the airplane but at, say, the next level up, you might be
19 satisfied, but your competitor would want to know a little
20 more, because he would write a better story if he knew about
21 that airplane.

22 INTERVIEWER: But you are not going to do it under
23 pressure from the press anyway. You are going to do what
24 you think is right, here, and presumably you could find some
25 place to draw the line where you wouldn't be giving away

1 intelligence secrets.

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't think you can. I don't
3 think you can draw a line beneath the single figure of the
4 total budget, which we have told the Congress we would not
5 oppose their releasing. I believe if you break it down
6 from that -- now, obviously, I can't logically say that some
7 particular one number under that would break down the world,
8 but what I am saying is, I can't tell you which number I can
9 give without somebody else demanding a different one, and
10 if I give you one sub-number, then you take Marks and
11 Marchetti, and you get a little bit more out of it. You know
12 what I mean. Even if it is not a number that in itself -- it
13 narrows it down by 10 percent or something, if you see what
14 I mean, and if I give you an innocuous -- a number for all
15 the janitors or something, it lets you begin to get down to
16 the number of agents we've got, in progressive order, for
17 instance.

18 So, I really feel there is a great danger in
19 erosion if we go below a single number.

20 INTERVIEWER: Thank you. One last question, and
21 I will turn off the machine. You do have some defenders,
22 by the way, and I talked to a couple of them in the last
23 few days, too, and one of them, who is a rather high-ranking
24 official in the government, said that --

25 INTERVIEWER: You found them both?



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 INTERVIEWER: What? That is the good news. The
2 bad news is, whenever I find one of your defenders, they
3 always sort of say, well, you know, I don't understand why
4 everybody else is bitching, and they sort of all talk as
5 though they think they are a minority of one, but they are
6 not a minority of one.

7 The point I wanted to let you take off on was, this
8 gentleman I was talking to said he thinks that you are going
9 to go down in the annals of American intelligence as the
10 first true Director of Central Intelligence.

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: That is my objective, not
12 from a personal point of view, but because that is what the
13 Executive Order that was signed today wants, that is what
14 the President told me he wanted a year ago when he asked me
15 to take this job, and that is what I have been trying to do
16 ever since, and that doesn't mean empire-building, it doesn't
17 mean trying to be a czar, it means the things I have told you
18 today, trying to be a good coordinator of the intelligence
19 operation.

20 That is what the Director of Central Intelligence was
21 set up to be in 1947, and has never been achieved, and I am not
22 out to run the Defense Department, or anybody else. I am out
23 to do what the Executive Order prescribes, to be sure the
24 tasking of all the intelligence collection agencies of the
25 government is well coordinated, to ensure that the analytic

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300150016-0

1 agencies all contribute to formulating national intelligence,
2 to ensure that the intelligence collected is well disseminated,
3 and to put together the budget which will balance the
4 allocations between these activities.

5 All of those new authorities are in this Executive
6 Order, and I would be remiss if I sat here and didn't tell you
7 I want to carry them out. I have been ordered to do that, and
8 I think if I carry them out well, which means cooperatively,
9 harmoniously with the other agencies of the government, I
10 will be the first true Director of Central Intelligence.

11 INTERVIEWER: The same gent also said that you had
12 more and better access to the President than your predecessors,
13 leading me to ask, when was the last time you had one of your
14 briefings with him? You haven't had one this week, have you?

15 ADMIRAL TURNER: A week ago today.

16 INTERVIEWER: Could you, without, obviously,
17 violating the confidentiality of those sessions, give me some
18 idea of what those sessions are like --

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

20 INTERVIEWER: -- how you prepare for them?

21 ADMIRAL TURNER: I prepare for them very
22 extensively. I have estimated to some other reporter one
23 day that for every hour I put in, half-hour I put in with the
24 President, I must put in ten to twelve hours of personal
25 preparation.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300150016-0

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 INTERVIEWER: Do you know what is on his mind,
2 or do you just sort of prepare for anything that is likely
3 to come up?

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I have the agenda. I
5 construct the agenda, but that doesn't, of course, inhibit
6 him from asking the things that aren't on it. I get surprised
7 sometimes, but what I do, Strobe, is, I have to first look at
8 what I have been giving him on a daily basis, because I
9 communicate with the President daily in writing briefings,
10 every morning, so I don't want to just give him that morning's
11 material the day of the week that I see him.

12 I try to take a week's worth of material and
13 perhaps put it in some perspective, looking at the longer
14 range or the broader implications of it. You tell him
15 today that Country X did so and so, Country Y did so and so,
16 but maybe in the oral briefing of the week you say, well,
17 the combination of those two things plus what Country Z did
18 would indicate to me there is a trend in that part of the
19 world.

20 Secondly, I have used a great deal of that time in
21 the early days, and I used to meet with him more often,
22 because we were taking a lot of time to learn about
23 intelligence -- that no longer is necessary -- but I used to
24 take a better part of one of those sessions a week to bring
25 in somebody who was an expert in deciphering phoney

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 handwriting, forgeries, to bring in somebody who operated one
2 of our technical collection systems, and explain it to him,
3 not everything we do in any of these categories, but a
4 representative feel for it. It was very educational for me.
5 We sort of went through this together, and learned about the
6 different intelligence procedures.

7 That is pretty well behind us, but even today I
8 do that once a month, bring somebody in for ten minutes to
9 talk to him.

10 INTERVIEWER: Could you tell me who the most
11 recent person you brought in was?

12 ADMIRAL TURNER: One of our chiefs of station from
13 the DDO was back here in the United States. He happened to
14 be a very competent younger officer in a rather important
15 country, with good access to the leaders of that country, so
16 I just took him in one day and sat him down with the
17 President of the United States and said, Mr. President, I
18 just want you to see what your CIA leading man in Country X
19 or in a country looks like, and he talked to him for ten
20 minutes.

21 The idea was to let the President understand
22 that that chief spook in that country is a human being, and
23 he also has a good grasp of that country. I encouraged him
24 to tell him what that country's policies were, and why they
25 were shaping a certain way.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 INTERVIEWER: You have taken Bob Bowey in once,
2 didn't you?

3 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I take Bob Bowey fairly
4 often. I took Bob Bowey a week ago today, and another
5 analyst with him. The three of us went in, and Harold Brown,
6 because it was the strategic analysis I am talking about,
7 and I felt, you know, it is very detailed, it is very
8 specific, and this analyst and Bob Bowey had done most of
9 the work, and I thought they ought to get credit for it
10 because it was a seminal piece of work.

11 I asked Harold Brown if he would be there because
12 clearly he has got a tremendous interest in the strategic
13 issue, and we had a very good discussion with the President
14 between all of us. Every one participated in it.

15 So, that is the kind of things we do, overviews,
16 and then also I take advantage of those meetings to take up
17 non-time urgent issues, long-term things.

18 INTERVIEWER: Over the horizon stuff.

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, and I am not talking now
20 so much -- a lot of these are technical things. What is the
21 possibility of developing lasers that will do so and so?
22 How do we see the prospects for that? What is the trend for
23 finding new ways of instant fertilizer that will double the
24 yields, and things. It is astounding the research that is
25 in the Intelligence Community, and some of these look like

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 they are going to be important five, ten years from now,
2 the trends. I try to sprinkle them in, and I have just been
3 very pleased because in the process I have been very
4 educated, but four or five months later I will pick up a
5 newspaper or a classified intelligence report and suddenly I
6 will find, hey, here is something that builds on what I
7 told the President four or five months ago.

8 INTERVIEWER: That is very helpful. That is
9 exactly the kind of human touch that we wanted to sort of
10 bring the relationship alive a little bit.

11 - - -
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

QUERY SHEET

DATE: 1-20-78 TIME: 1215 TAKEN BY: Heta

QUERY FROM: Bruce Nelson /

ORGANIZATION: TIME

PHONE: _____

QUERY: Time is firmly planning a cover-story for issue
on stands 30 January - Turner will be on the cover -
very little on embargo - more attention on what kind
of intelligence agency we should have and what
kind is likely to emerge -

SOURCE OF ANSWER: _____

ANSWER PROVIDED: _____

DATE PROVIDED: _____ TIME PROVIDED: _____

COMMENTS/NOTES _____

① Need interview with DCI + Bowie and
any others we may suggest -

② Who best to talk in broad philosophical
terms about best intelligence

① Bowie - { 1300 - lunch - my office
1400
1430 - Jack Blake

STROBE TALBOTT, Diplomatic Correspondent, TIME Magazine

His various assignments have taken him to Eastern Europe, Moscow, China (accompanied the Kissinger entourage in October 1975) and in 1976 he was the White House correspondent for TIME.

In September 1975, Talbott wrote a TIME essay on the necessity of a good Central Intelligence Agency. Using all the revelations that were aired during the 1973-75 period, he pointed out that the CIA was a victim of circumstances in many cases and suggested that past Presidents and the Congress were to be blamed for ducking their responsibilities. In January 1976, Strobe Talbott interviewed Mr. Colby before he left the Agency. The questions were probing, yet fair.

BRUCE NELAN, Washington Correspondent/Military, TIME Magazine

Nelan has spent at least nine years abroad. One of his posts included Bonn, West Germany, and he was considered a China watcher in the late '60's and early '70's.

Strobe Talbott and Bruce Nelan co-authored the 20 June 1977 TIME magazine article on the CIA. The article was critical of the Agency's past performances on prediction and reporting but had some very good pictures to depict the Agency in action on a daily basis (see attached).